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Contamination of Mars  
C a r l  Sagan, Elliott C. Levinthal, Joshua Lederberg 
Two papers  concerning the problem of biological contamination of Mars  
The f i r s t  (3 argues that the proba- have recently appeared in this journal. 
bility of re lease  of entrapped organisms f rom the inside of a spacecraft  is 
vanishingly small ,  and that the probability of reproduction of a t e r r e s t r i a l  
microbial  contaminant on the Martian surface is a l so  negligibly small. The 
second paper (2J argues  that in any case  Mars  (and a l so  Venus) may have 
been exposed to t e r r e s t r i a l  microorganisms deposited by Soviet spacecraft. 
Both papers conclude that the present steri l ization standards adopted by the 
Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of the International Council of 
Scientific Unions be abandoned. 
ability of a single viable organism aboard any spacecraft  intended for  
Martian landing be l e s s  than 1 X 
impact over a period of decades by each unsteri l ized flyby or  orbi ter  be 
3 x 10 We have very grave reservat ions about the arguments 
presented in both papers ,  and wish here  to clarify the difference between 
their  views and ours ,  and to delineate problem a r e a s  cryingout fo r  fur- 
t he r  study. 
These recommendations a r e  that the prob- 
and that the probability for accidental 
-5  o r  less .  
D r .  Sagan is Assis tant  Professor  of Astronomy a t  Harvard University and 
staff m e m b e r  of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.  Drs .  Levinthal and Lederberg a r e ,  respectively, Director,  
Instrumentation Research  Laboratory, and Professor  of Genetics, Depart-  
ment  of Genetics, Stanford University School of Medicine, Palo Alto, 
California. 
1 
The COSPAR recommendations were  based upon an analytic equation for  
U, the number of viable microorganisms per  capsule deposited on the Mart ian 
surface,  obtained f rom probability theory by Sagan and Coleman [ ( 3 ) ;  - slightly 
revised in (4)] .  - The focus of this discussion was the desirabil i ty of perform- 
ing a large number of biological experiments on the Mart ian surface before 
there  i s  a sizable probability of contamination. 
m o r e  emphasis should be placed on the r i sks  of the very  f i r s t  missions,  since 
these may  help set  wider goals than the biological exploration of Mars .  ) Our 
commitment to this goal, measured by the parameter  p, was put a t  0. 999. 
While the discussion of Sagan and Coleman inser ted representative numerical  
values into the analytic expression, i t  was indicated that these were  tentative 
values, subject to revision by future  research ,  and the reader  was invited to 
make his own selection of numerical  values. 
acceptable levels of contamination occurred in Florence i n  May 1964, in a 
study group on standards for space probe sterilization, chaired by Professor  
C. -G. Heden, of the Karolinska Institute, Stockholm. The other m e m b e r s  
of this group were  Alan Brown, U. S. A. ; Auduoin Dollfus, France ;  Marcel  
Florkin, Belgium; Lawrence Hall, U. S. A. ; A. A. Imshenetskii, U. S. S. R. ; 
C a r l  Sagan, U. S. A. ; P. H. A. Sneath, United Kingdom; and Wolf Vishniac, 
U. S. A. In the deliberations of this study group each member  present (all 
but Professor  Imshenetskii, who was absent because of i l lness) gave his bes t  
es t imate  for  each numerical  parameter  entering into the analytic framework. 
The resulting values of u were  then derived. 
-4 final value of u = 10 
values adopted by Sagan and Coleman were  not in a l l  ca ses  those adopted by 
the COSPAR group, and the value of 10 adopted by the study group, and 
approved by the executive council of COSPAR, represented the best  opinion 
of the study group menbers .  
(It can also be argued that 
The COSPAR deliberations on 
The discussion i terated in a 
. Contrary to the asser t ion  in ( I ) ,  - the numerical  
-4 
Subsequent COSPAR deliberations have reduced 
to 
In the absence of a la rge  body of experience with Mariner  and Voyager 
spacecraf t ,  and in  the absence of in situ studies of the Martian surface and 
subsurface,  we a r e  very  ignorant of the relevant parameters .  




would, in the absence of other ecological limitations, resul t  in l e s s  than a 
decade in  a microbial  population of the Mart ian soil comparable to that of 
the Ear th ' s .  This is  an  example of heuris t ic  interest  only, but it does 
indicate that the e r r o r s  in problems of planetary contamination may be 
~ 
extremely serious.  If we ag ree  that we des i re  1 - p = 10 - 3  with a n  uncertainty 
in our commitment of, say, a factor  of 100, then each other parameter  of 
relevance, such a s  the probability of re lease  of encapsuled contaminants, o r  
the probability of multiplication of t e r r e s t r i a l  microorganisms on Mars,  
mus t  be known to roughly s imi la r  precision. F o r  each of the objections posed 
by Horowitz e t  al. ( l) ,  we believe there  exist  uncertainties in  the relevant 
probabilities of factors  of 100 o r  more,  to say nothing of the possible presence 
of unforseen factors. Where there a r e  legitimate differences of opinion in 
discussions of planetary quarantine, the burden of proof must  fall on those 
advocating a relaxation of standards. 
upward revision of the allowable microbial  load per  spacecraft  i s  now ~ O S -  
s ible,  on the bas i s  of new evidence. We now examine this evidence. It 
fa l l s  into four categories,  release,  survival, dissemination, and growth of 
t e r  r e  stria1 microbial  contaminants on Mars. 
-- - 
Horowitz et  al. state that a large --
Release 
.'W 
An important point in the connection between the COSPAR conclusions 
and the arguments  presented in (3 )  - and (4) - appears to have been missed  by 
the authors of (1). - 
viable microorganisms per  capsule which a r e  distributed outside the cap- 
sule,  on the Martian surface" [@), i tal ics in original]. 
recommendations r e f e r  to the "probability that a single viable organism 
be aboard any vehicle intended f o r  planetary landing" [(z), i tal ics added]. 
The  difference clear ly  re la tes  to  the mean  probability of re lease  of a con- 
tained microorganism. 
(2) and (4) - were  influenced by our ignorance of re lease  over a period 
of decades. 
probability is vanishingly small ,  and that surface steri l ization techniques 
should therefore  be adequate. 
The parameter  u is defined as  "the mean  number of 
The COSPAR 
The COSPAR deliberations and the discussion of 
Horowitz e t  al. argue that we can now decide that this re lease  -- 




and the i r s  is our unwillingness to consider a compound r i sk  that may  be 
small  by conventional standards - say, 10 
the stakes a r e  very high. 
-2 - a s  equivalent to zero  when 
One ser ious contingency for  re lease  of contained microorganisms is a 
crash-landing, and, particularly, a hypervelocity impact. Judging f rom 
experience with lunar crater ing,  a spacecraft  impacting Mars  with a velocity 
about 6 k m / s e c  will be totally pulverized. 
impact indicates that even a t  impact velocities of 0. 6 km/sec  o r  less ,  a 
significant f ract ion of the miss i le ' s  m a s s  is not in the impact c r a t e r  and i s  
unrecoverable ( 6 ) .  
indicate that contained microorganisms will survive such impacts. 
escape velocity f r o m  Mars  is 5 k m  sec  
into the Martian atmosphere can be designed s o  that aerodynamic braking 
will  slow the vehicle down to a velocity << 1 k m / s e c  with some high re l i -  
ability, and f o r  a range of such contingencies a s  the approach orientation 
of the capsule (7). - 
There  a r e  other contingencies such a s  a n  unfavorable re t rorocket  firing 
accelerating r a the r  than decelerating the capsule, accidental failure of a 
bus-deflection maneuver,  etc. A specification of each contingency of 
hypervelocity impact with associated probabilities needs to be made; until 
- 2  
then probabilities N 10 
able fo r  planned U. s. and Soviet missions.  
<< 10 
high- speed impact, o r  by the development of failsafe terminal-destruct  
s ter i l izat ion procedures  (3 ,4) ;  but such devices a r e  not now planned in the 
Mariner  and Voyager programs. 
But experience with miss i le  
The shells and grenades used in bacteriological warfare  
The 
- 1  . Capsules intended for entry 
But what the probabilities actually a r e  is  not well known. 
of hypervelocity impact a r e  not obviously unreason- 
This probability- can be made  
-2  by failsafe precautionary terminal  correct ions in case  of imminent 
- 
Information on the fragmentation s ize  distribution of lower velocity 
crash-landings is needed and almost totally lacking. 
a var ie ty  of impact velocities, and the possibility that the fragmentation 
distribution function is  bi-  o r  polymodal should not be overlooked. If f rag-  
mentation tends to  occur along identifiable f rac ture  planes , surface s te r i l i -  
zation of such planes will be very effective, a s  Horowitz (8) has  emphasized. 




Unfortunately there  a r e  a lmost  no data available on f rac ture  modes for 
various scenarios  of miss ion  failure. 
subject i s  urgently needed. 
An engineering examination of this 
Even af ter  the successful landing of an intact spacecraft ,  there  is  a 
It i s  argued in  ( 1 )  that aeolian variety of possible re lease  mechanisms. 
erosion i s  negligible f o r  a period of decades on Mars.  
calculations by Leovy (9) put the maximum wind velocity on Mars  as 80 to 
160 k m / h r ,  while the authors calculate that 145 to 250 k m / h r  is required 
for  rolling and saltation. 
winds a r e  "probably too low to initiate gra in  movement, ' I  (our italics). 
Both calculations a re ,  in fact ,  s o  uncertain that the resu l t s  can m o r e  accu- 
rately be considered identical. The la rge  temperature  fluctuations on Mars  
lead naturally to the presence of dust  devils with la rge  vortex velocities 
(10)  and frequent observations of yellow clouds with the same photometric 
propert ies  a s  the Martian bright a r e a s  strongly point to windblown dust (1 1 ) .  
The idea that all, o r  even most ,  of the dust s torms  a r e  produced by meteori te  
impacts is highly unlikely, and contrary to the opinion of the majority of 
observers  on Mars. 
of Martian c ra t e r s ,  probably by dust. 
m o r e  eroded, and have much flatter bottoms and more  filled-in appearances,  
than c r a t e r s  on the Moon. 
- 
One argument is that 
- 
Horowitz e t  al. conclude f r o m  this that the Martian --
-
- 
The Mariner 4 photographs show a very marked filling 
Martian c r a t e r s  a r e  generally much 
Horowitz -- et al. quote aeolian erosion ra tes  in lucite for  t e r r e s t r i a l  
dese r t s  of just  under 1 mm every few decades. 
sof t  mater ia l ,  the extrapolation of these resul ts  to the erosion of exter ior  
spacecraf t  components on Mars  is surely uncertain to severa l  o rde r s  of 
magnitude. 
is badly needed. 
vehicles that  have s t ruc ture  and crev ices  a t  a depth of some mil l imeters ,  
and i t  appears  obvious that, fo r  the present,  steri l ization a t  least  down to 
such depths i s  necessary.  Surface steri l ization may be inadequate for this task. 
Heat soaking is probably required, but for  this purpose lower temperatures  
o r  shor te r  t imes  might be adequate: the thermal  wave need not penetrate to 
the deep inter ior  of the spacecraft .  
While lucite is a relatively 
Fur ther  information on expected aeolian erosion ra tes  on Mars  
There  a r e  many prospective components of Mars  landing 
5 
. 
It mus t  a l so  not be forgotten that the values of pa rame te r s  chosen in (3)  
Our immediate concern is 
- 
and (4)  represent  averages over many missions.  
with the choice of pa rame te r s  fo r  the first landed missions,  and here  we 
must  be more  cautious. 
ably not l e s s  than 0.1,  but might optimistically be made a s  smal l  a s  0.  5. 
Even this number in the arguments presented in (1) fails  to take into account 
the la rge  range of intermediate possibilities between complete failure due to 
c r a s h  landing, and aeolian erosion down to a depth of some mil l imeters .  
F o r  example, I - P  is not the chance of a catastrophic c r a s h  landing a s  
stated in ( l ) ,  but r a the r  the probability that some fraction of the experiments 
in a lander do not operate a s  planned. 
engineering and scientific success.  
of par t ia l  damage, which allows organisms f r o m  some par t s  of the space- 
c ra f t  but not f r o m  others  to reach the Martian surface.  
- 




Pt is the probability of complete 
We must  take into account the possibility 
There  a r e  severa l  other spacecraft  fractionation mechanisms that have 
not been given near ly  enough attention. 
nal and seasonal (the seasonal  thermal  and geostrophic winds a r e  probably even 
higher than the diurnal ones) will produce vibrational s t r e s s e s  over long 
periods.  There is possible metal fatigue and thermal  erosion due to the 
ve ry  large diurnal and seasonal  temperature  variations. 
data  on rocks,  there is no information on the survival of spacecraf t  a f te r  the 
14,000 cycles over 100 KO represented by a few decades on Mars .  
spacecraf t  a r e  constructed to 
during t ransi t ,  they probably can be constructed to survive a few decades on 
M a r s .  
a r e  possibil i t ies of chemical weathering. 
( thickness,  a few microns)  w i l l  certaintly be breached by aeolian erosion. 
If the Mart ian environment is slightly reducing (e.  g . ,  if halide-substituted 
hydrocarbons a r e  present)  chemical weathering of the exposed metall ic s u r -  
faces  will occur.  
s te r i lan ts  we have no assurance that all organisms released by chemical 
weathering will automatically be killed. 
The high prevailing winds, both diur-  
While there i s  some 
Since 
survive the thermal  environment of space 
But there  is no evidence that they a r e  being s o  constructed. There 
The oxide coats of surface metals  
While many nonaqueous chemical corrosives  a r e  a lso 
There  may even be erosion 
6 
mechanisms involving an  indigenous biota. 
c ra f t  erosion mechanisms that we have not been clever  enough to  think of. 
In o rde r  to allow f o r  such possibilities, the in te r iors  of spacecraft  must  be 
s ter i l ized until bet ter  information is available. 
There may well be other space- 
Survival -
Horowitz e t  al. do not question experiments that show that many var ie -  
t i es  of t e r r e s t r i a l  microorganisms survive simulated Martian conditions 
indefinitely. But legit imate questions can be ra i sed  about what fraction 
of the likely microbial  contaminants of a spacecraft  can survive Mart ian 
conditions [cf. (3 ,  - -  4)]. 
origin o r  derived during assembly and s torage a t  the launch facility (generally 
in w a r m  cl imates  for  the United States, in colder climates for the Soviet 
Union). Do the likely contaminants include anaerobic psychrophils? Are  
those organisms that survive terminal heat soaking likely to survive 
Mart ian low temperatures? 
killed on M a r s  by ultraviolet light before being shielded by absorbing grains  
of surface mater ia l ,  o r  by other microorganisms? Each  of these questions 
can  be approached experimentally; until they have, we must  proceed 
cautiously. 
Most such contaminants a r e  probably of human 
What fraction of re leased Contaminants will be 
Dissemination -
In the case  of a hard landing, and, particularly,  of a hypervelocity 
impact  of a spacecraf t  on Mars ,  spacecraf t  f ragments  will be distributed 
over  a wide a rea .  
unshielded t e r r e s t r i a l  organisms to accumulate an ultraviolet mean lethal 
dose on M a r s  - f ragments  travelling in parabolic t ra jector ies  a t  6 k m / s e c  
will  cover a la te ra l  distance - 1000 km. 
surface-s ter i l ized spacecraf t  assembled under clean room procedures is 
10 ; distributed uniformly over the Mart ian surface,  i t  resu l t s  in a loading 
density of one microorganism every 10 k m  
In a period of minutes - l e s s  than the time for many 
A typical microbial  load of a 
7 
2 
on Mars.  However, there  
7 
a r e  fa i lure  modes that lead to much higher loading densities: e. g . ,  inflight 
rupture of nutrient broth containers ca r r i ed  f o r  bioassays on Mars .  
c ra f t  should be designed to minimize the r isks  attendant to such failures.  
Space- 
Aside f rom crash-landings there a r e  other possible dissemination mech- 
The prominent dust  s torms  and high wind velocities previously an isms .  
r e fe r r ed  to imply that a e r i a l  t ransport  of contaminants will occur on Mars .  
While i t  is probably t rue that a single unshielded t e r r e s t r i a l  microorganism 
on the Mart ian sur face  - even the most  radiation-resistant variety - would 
rapidly be enervated and killed by the ultraviolet f l u x ,  this by no means 
applies to a l l  contamination scenarios.  The Martian surface mater ia l  c e r -  
tainly contains a substantial  fraction of f e r r i c  oxides, which a r e  extremely 
strongly absorbing in the near  ultraviolet. 
oxide identification, the r ed  color of Mars  c lear ly  indicates major  electronic 
transit ions a t  shor t  visible wavelengths. A t e r r e s t r i a l  microorganism im-  
bedded in such a particle can be shielded f rom ultraviolet light and sti l l  be 
t ransported about the planet. In addition, microorganisms generally do not 
dis t r ibute  themselves singly, but tend to clump. While the peripheral  organ- 
i s m s  may  be rapidly killed by solar ultraviolet radiation, microorganisms in 
the clump in t e r io r s  m a y  survive for  long periods of t ime. These points have 
experimental  confirmation, in  the LiJster program of spaceflights in the vicinity 
of the E a r t h  (12) .  
ultraviolet  light and other radiation for  much longer than the time calculated 
on the bas i s  of individual death curves.  Not a l l  re leased contaminants will 
successfully adhere to shielding par t ic les .  
experiments  on the ultraviolet illumination of an aerosol  of bacter ia  and 
pulverized limonite, and subsequent scoring, which can clarify these issues .  
In fact, apar t  f rom the f e r r i c  
Here microorganisms were observed to survive solar  - 
There a r e  simple laboratory 
We do not know enough about M a r s  to exclude subsurface transportation 
of contaminants - e.  g . ,  by underground r ivers .  
are connected by such r ive r  systems,  and some evidence exis ts  for  tectonic 
activity on M a r s  ( see  below). 
T e r r e s t r i a l  volcanic belts 
8 
If aqueous environments exist  on Mars ,  we shall  undoubtedly bias  our 
landing a r e a s  to such s i tes .  
amplified by many o r d e r s  of magnitude; and i f  aqueous underground t ranspor t  
i s  a r ea l  possibility, dissemination will a lso be amplified. 
mean  contaminant loading densities of 1 m 
biologically most  interesting a reas  a r e  by no means out of the question. 
The resulting microbial  load can thereby be 
In either case,  
- 2  and much higher densit ies in the 
Before we d iscuss  the problem of growth of contaminants on Mars ,  we 
wish to s t r e s s  that the dissemination of viable microorganisms without growth 
may  have ser ious  consequences. 
be an a s ses smen t  of the potential future utility of the planet Mars  by the 
human species .  
s iderat ions have had, to date, no effect on our level of commitment to a 
decontamination program. 
thought to be great ,  we would be willing to increase the costs and efforts to 
achieve effective steri l ization. 
ser iously compromised by the dissemination even of nonpropagating t e r r e s  - 
trial microorganisms in the form of spores  that survive the present  environ- 
ment. 
One resu l t  of continuing observations could 
No  such assessment  has  thus far been made, and such con- 
It is obvious that if the future utility of M a r s  were 
Any future exploitation of Mars  might be 
The question of growth of t e r r e s t r i a l  microorganisms on Mars  is tied 
While the mean Martian to the question of the availability of liquid water .  
conditions a r e  inconsistent with liquid water ,  there a r e  a variety of possible 
microenvironments that  permit  liquid water ,  a t  l eas t  in isolated t imes  and 
places .  We have suggested (13) that geothermal activity on Mars  provides 
water  and local high temperatures  conducive for  the replication of t e r r e s -  
tr ial-type organisms. Horowitz -- et al. (1) - believe that they know enough about 
the Mart ian environment to exclude such possibilities, and state their  belief 
that  M a r s  is  a n  undifferentiated and geologically inactive planet. They a l so  
s ta te  that, while there  may  be lineaments observed i n  the Mariner  4 photo- 
graphs,  on the E a r t h  the water outgassing associated with such lineaments 
is recirculated sur face  water,  and not juvenile water.  
- 
9 
However, M a r s  ve ry  likely contains a subsurface permafros t  layer ,  
and there  is now a var ie ty  of evidence for loosely bound o r  adsorbed water 
in the surface mater ia l  (14, 1 5 ) .  
re lease  otherwise unavailable water to the surface.  
f ract ion of the planet undergoing such geothermal activity should be ve ry  
small ,  however. It is a lso possible that the permafrost  cap i s  breached 
occasionally by meteori te  impact, The question of the differentiation of 
M a r s  is a highly debatable one. 
sma l l e r  than M a r s  show c lear  signs of differentiation. 
m a s s  much l e s s  than that of Mars ,  shows unambiguous signs of vulcanism. 
There  are a l so  severa l  ca ses  of lunar outgassing, apparently well documented. 
Studies of the thermal  history of Mars  a r e  in a prel iminary state,  and a t  
l eas t  some models (16) predict  a fa i r ly  differentiated planet. Radar and 
other evidence f o r  major  elevation differences on Mars ,  and ridges r e s e m -  
bling submarine tectonic r idges on Ear th ,  has  been published (17, 18). 
I In ei ther  case geothermal activity would -- 
At any given time the 
I 
Meteorites whose parent body radii  a r e  far 
The Moon, with a 
-
-- 
The lifetime of liquid water  on Mars  is a more  ser ious question. Salt 
deposits will lower the eutectic point - in many cases  by severa l  tens of 
degrees .  Horowitz e t  al .  
maintain that all halophiles a r e  aerobes,  but we believe this must  be an a r t i -  
fac t  of the experimental  conditions; not much effort  has been put into finding 
anaerobic halophiles (19). - 
water  is jus t  under 6 mb. 
f r o m  a few mb to almost  20 m b  (18), - but the mixing rat io  of water is - 10 . 
Equator ia l  daytime temperatures  range up to 20 o r  30" C (3, corresponding 
to saturat ion vapor p r e s s u r e s  of 2 5  mb and higher. 
exposed on Mars  a t  temperatures  = 273" K will evaporate initially a t  a ra te  
N 10 g / c m  /sec. The evaporation is so  fast  that ver t ical  and horizon- 
ta l  t ranspor t  of water  away f rom the pool will be the rate-limiting s teps  
in the ea r ly  phases of vaporization. 
a t  these tempera tures  is  of the same o rde r  as the total p re s su re  the p re s su re  
difference will lead to hydrodynamic flow, and winds will c a r r y  the vapor 
away. The t ranspor t  ra te  has  not, to the bes t  of our knowledge, been cal-  
culated. Before long, however, the high latent heat of vaporization of water 
There may  be frequent briney pools on M a r s .  
The triple point par t ia l  p re s su re  of pure liquid 
Average total p re s su res  on Mars  probably range 
-3  
A pool of liquid water 
- 2  2 
Because the saturation vapor pressure  
1 0  
should resul t  in freezing the upper surface of the pool, cutting down the 
vaporization ra te  substantially. 
exposed during the hottest par t  of the day, and sealed fo r  the remainder  of 
the day. 
It m a y  be that some pools on Mars  a r e  thus 
Other locales where the partial  p re s su re  of water may temporar i ly  be 
comparable to the total ambient pressure  a r e  the edge of the polar caps,  and 
the dawn l imb of Mars .  
a pool a t  the bottom of a c ra t e r  (perhaps formed during c ra t e r  formation) is 
of par t icular  interest .  
about 190" K, a temperature  reached before sunrise ,  probably in most  
locales on M a r s .  
the computed l ifetimes of the condensates a r e  15  min o r  less.  
diffusion will again be the limiting step,  and saturation vapor p re s su res  may 
be maintained in crevices  and soil inters t ices  for periods approaching an 
hour. 
temporar i ly .  
under Mart ian p r e s s u r e s  and temperature  cycling, and with a var ie ty  of wind 
velocities, tend to support the conclusion that thin layers  of liquid water a r e  
generally formed each  morning at t ropical  latitudes on Mars .  These experi-  
ments  will be reported more  fully elsewhere.  
indicates that many t e r r e s t r i a l  microorganisms can grow, even i f  liquid 
water  is available f o r  only 15 min/day, in  otherwise subzero condi- 
t ions;  o r  in so i l  microenvironments where liquid water is  available a s  a con- 
sequence of f reeze  -thaw cycling. 
many microorganisms seen capable of growth a t  slow ra tes  a t  temperatures  
nea r  0" C .  
growth and replication of t e r r e s t r i a l  microorganisms on Mars ,  over a pe r -  
iod of decades.  
Because of the inhibition of horizontal eddy diffusion, 
The f ros t  point of 20 p precipitable water  vapor is 
A dawn haze is  actually seen frequently. After sunrise  
However, 
As the temperature  goes above 0" C ,  liquid water will be formed 
Experiments  performed in the laboratory of one of us (C.  S. ) 
A variety of experiments (2) 
Although much more  work is required,  
There a r e  too many possibilities s t i l l  open to d ismiss  significant 
- 2  
The use of 10 f o r  the probability that a t e r r e s t r i a l  microorganism 
deposited on the surface of Mars  will grow and contaminate the planet may 
in f ac t  be too low ra ther  than too high. 
in planning the s t ra tegy of planetary exploration; that is, over  a long time 
sca le  we will land not jus t  a t  an  average location on the planet, but a t  a place 
We anticipate that we will be clever 
11 
. .  
where t e r r e s t r i a l  microorganisms a r e  most  likely to grow. 
concern is  not necessar i ly  with growth over la rge  a r e a s  of the planet, but 
ra ther  with growth at those favorable s i tes  chosen fo r  subsequent investiga- 
tions. Thus, deposited microorganisms must  simply survive exposure to 
average Martian conditions (which we already know will occur with some 
likelihood), and subsequently grow upon a r r i v a l  a t  a favorable locale. 
Our subsequent 
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We believe that the probabilities of spacecraf t  erosion and f rac ture ,  
survival f rom the ultraviolet flux, and subsequent ultimate deposition in a 
w a r m  and wet locale on M a r s  may be ra ther  high. 
a r e  to be relaxed, we must  be quite ce r t a in -  much more  certain than we 
can be in our present  state of ignorance - that such will not be the case.  
If steri l ization standards 
Additional considerations may be drawn concerning the reassessment  
of flyby and orbi ter  missions to Mars .  
Mariner  4 mission to these deliberations is its demonstration that a prob- 
ability of 3 x 10 
o r  orbi ter  spacecraf t  does not preclude the carrying out of useful missions.  
Because of the low atmospheric  p re s su re  on M a r s ,  spacecraft  may  be placed 
in very  close orbi ts  permitting extremely high topographical resolution a t  
per iapsis ,  without compromising the steri l ization standards. The cost  of any 
level of commitment to prevention of contamination i s  much g rea t e r  for  
landers  than for orb i te rs  o r  flybys. 
r i s k s  associated with a lander mission i s  subject to a wider margin  of e r r o r  
than an orbi ter  miss ion  at  our present level of ignorance. This implies a 
planetary exploration s t ra tegy of the following sor t :  Flyby and especially 
orb i te r  missions a r e  c a r r i e d  out within the present  constraints on accidental 
impact to obtain information that can lead to an  improved assessment  and 
refinement of the r i s k s  of planetary landing and the parameters  associated it. 
At the same time, e f for t s  to improve steri l ization skil ls  a r e  necessary in any 
case.  Such remote observations f rom a planetary orbi ter  might, for  example, 
indicate the location and distribution of a r e a s  of increased moisture  and 
One principal contribution of the 
-5  o r  l e s s  for accidental planetary impact by unsteri l izedflyby 
It is  a l so  c lear  that any evaluation of the 
1 2  
t empera tu re  (1  3). 
period would be such that even conservative e s t ima tes  of the load of t e r r e s -  
t r i a l  microorganisms will be satisfied. 
Whatever lander miss ions  a r e  ca r r i ed  out during this - 
We now comment on the contention of Mur ray  e t  al. ( 2 )  that the Soviet -- - 
space p rogram is  not fa i lsafe  in the sense that Amer ican  flybys a r e  deflected 
away f r o m  the planet during midcourse maneuvers ;  that  there  is consequently 
some possibility that  Zond 2 impacted Mars ;  that future  Soviet space vehicles,  
undergoing s ter i l izat ion procedures  not evaluated in the West,will a l so  im-  
pact M a r s ;  and therefore  that the s ter i l izat ion requirements  on Amer ican  
space vehicles can  be considerably relaxed. 
argument  of ( 2 )  - is  inconsistent with that of (1) :  - 
of Contaminating M a r s ,  then Zond 2 has  not contaminated it. But i f ,  a s  we 
argue ,  there  i s  a significant chance of contaminating M a r s ,  do the arguments  
in ( 2 )  necessar i ly  follow? E a c h  contention of Mur ray  e t  a l .  has  some 
associated uncertainty, and it is by no means c l ea r  that any viable mic ro -  
o rgan i sms  have landed on the Mart ian surface a s  a r e su l t  of the Zond miss ion  
( 2 2 ) .  F u r t h e r  information f r o m  the Soviet Union would be ex t remely  relevant 
in this regard .  
Zond 2, in te rac ts  with the mean  Mart ian environment, while a par t ia l ly  
successful  lander  has  fa i lure  modes that permi t  interaction with the m o s t  
favorable  environments for  microbial  growth on M a r s .  If an unsteri l ized 
Zond 2 space vehicle has impacted M a r s ,  i t  does not follow that the United 
States  may with abandon land spacecraf t  that have been only surface 
s te r i l i zed .  
i s s u e s  concerns a d r y  f o r e s t  in tinderbox conditions. 
f ront  of us throws a lighted match into the forest ,  i t  does not follow that we 
m a y  throw large numbers  of lighted matches as well, par t icular ly  i f  we a r e  
seeking out the d r i e s t  pa r t s  of the fores t .  His match  might not ignite the 
f o r e s t ;  o u r s  might. Also, if we a r e  cautious with matches,  the needs for  
caution and the methods f o r  achieving i t  might be grasped by our companion. 
We f i r s t  point out that the 
i f  there  i s  negligible chance 
- --
- 
We note that a n  accidental  impact, such a s  suggested for 
An analogy that has  been useful in discussing such s ter i l izat ion 
If the individual in 
Our planetary quarantine program must  take into account the total 
h i s to ry  of the planet in question, and mus t  certainly consider possible con- 
tamination result ing f r o m  missions other than those of the United States.  It 
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is a l so  useful to make Soviet scientists aware  that there  is a n  interrelation- 
, ship between the policies of our respective nations. This interrelationship 
is a l so  "multi lateral .  
The conclusion in ( 2 )  however, that the U. S. contribution should equal - 
some specified fract ion of the probable number of viable t e r r e s t r i a l  micro-  
organisms t ransfer red  to M a r s  by present  and foreseeable Soviet efforts 
s e e m s  to be based on some misunderstanding of the purpose of planetary 
quarantine. 
of migrants  matched to the resources  of the target  planet. 
p rog ram designed to minimize the possibility that the planet will be infected 
with a single viable organism that might propagate now o r  in the future. Our 
choice of quarantine policy and the costs  and efforts that a r e  a consequence 
of that  policy a r e  a measure  of the importance that we ascr ibe  to an uncon- 
taminated planet. Our knowledge of Soviet missions to M a r s  is relevant in 
permitt ing us  to es t imate  the probability that the planet is now infected with 
viable replicating organisms.  
the utility of maintaining our steri l ization efforts.  
ra t io  of the cost  of our effor ts  to  the potential gains that justify those 
effor ts  constant, then a proportionate reduction of our steri l ization efforts 
could be justified. 
quarantine policy. 
They s e e m  to argue that if  there is a probability, P, that Soviet missions 
have infected M a r s  with N viable organisms,  then a satisfactory United 
States policy would be to deliver some specified fraction of P X N organisms 
pe r  mission. 
It is not an immigration policy designed to keep the total  number 
It is a quarantine 
This implies some proportionate reduction in 
If we wish to keep the 
But this would then lead to a smal l  change in the present  
This is a very different resu l t  f rom that of Mur ray  e t  al. -- 
Keeping in mind the scientific goals of Mart ian exploration, and their  
mult i la teral  nature,  we might conclude that these goals can be bet ter  achieved 
by delivering steri l izable bat ter ies  to the Soviet Union ra ther  than viable 
microorganisms to Mars .  
about our  advances in decontamination technology a r e  widely disseminated. 
There  is a r e a l  possibility that a credible implementation of our present  
s ter i l izat ion policies will have a salutary influence in increasing the concern 
We should make cer ta in  that specific information 
14 
about planetary quarantine within the Soviet Union, 
-- e t  al. would have exactly the opposite effect .  
of the Study Group on Standards for Spacecraf t  Steri l ization were  approved 
by i t s  parent  body, the COSPAR Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful  
E f f e c t s  of Space Exper iments  and by the executive council of COSPAR. 
sentatives f r o m  both the United States and the Soviet Union participated in the 
act ivi t ies  on all levels ,  including those of the executive council. The Soviet 
Union has  a lso,  in the recent  space t reaty,  indicated i ts  concern with plane- 
t a ry  quarantine.  
COSPAR and within the space t rea ty  can be used to increase  positive feedback 
on miss ions  planning and s ter i l izat ion technology between both spacefaring 
nations. 
The proposal  of M u r r a y  
The COSPAR recommendations 
Repre -  
Methods should be explored by which the agreements  a t  
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